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Abstract
Using event-related fMRI in a sample of 42 healthy participants, we compared the cerebral activity maps obtained when
classifying spoken sentences based on the mental content of the main character (belief, deception or empathy) or on the
emotional tonality of the sentence (happiness, anger or sadness). To control for the effects of different syntactic
constructions (such as embedded clauses in belief sentences), we subtracted from each map the BOLD activations obtained
during plausibility judgments on structurally matching sentences, devoid of emotions or ToM. The obtained theory of mind
(ToM) and emotional speech comprehension networks overlapped in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction, posterior
cingulate cortex, right anterior temporal lobe, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and in the left inferior frontal sulcus. These
regions form a ToM network, which contributes to the emotional component of spoken sentence comprehension.
Compared with the ToM task, in which the sentences were enounced on a neutral tone, the emotional sentence
classification task, in which the sentences were play-acted, was associated with a greater activity in the bilateral superior
temporal sulcus, in line with the presence of emotional prosody. Besides, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was more
active during emotional than ToM sentence processing. This region may link mental state representations with verbal and
prosodic emotional cues. Compared with emotional sentence classification, ToM was associated with greater activity in the
caudate nucleus, paracingulate cortex, and superior frontal and parietal regions, in line with behavioral data showing that
ToM sentence comprehension was a more demanding task.
Citation: Herve´ P-Y, Razafimandimby A, Jobard G, Tzourio-Mazoyer N (2013) A Shared Neural Substrate for Mentalizing and the Affective Component of Sentence
Comprehension. PLoS ONE 8(1): e54400. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400
Editor: Maurice Ptito, University of Montreal, Canada
Received August 8, 2012; Accepted December 12, 2012; Published January 16, 2013
Copyright: ! 2013 Herve´ et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by Grant Agence Nationale de la Recherche ANR-05-NEURO-034-01. The funders had no role in study design, data collection
and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: nathalie.tzourio@u-bordeaux2.fr
Introduction
Humans are able to build representations of the contents of the
mind of others, such as their beliefs, desires or intentions, and this
enables them to understand, predict or act on the behavior of
others [1]. These complex representations of the cognitive or
emotional mental states of others may include what they know, or
don’t know of a shared situation, as well as their long-term goals or
salient psychological traits. This capacity is usually referred to as
theory-of-mind (ToM), intentional stance, cognitive empathy, folk
psychology or mentalizing, and has been associated with the
activity of a number of cortical areas, including the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), posterior cingulate
cortex (pCC) and anterior temporal lobe (aTL) [2].
ToM is aimed at identifying the reasons for the recognized
actions or emotions of others, which is different from their
recognition. As explained by Sabbagh [3]: ‘‘in order to correctly infer
that someone is sad because she got a poor mark on an exam one needs to detect
sadness from the observable information, know that she received a poor mark,
and perhaps know that she had wanted to do well’’.
These distinct, but interrelated emotion recognition and
mentalizing processes seem to rely on different neural systems.
In the particular context of emotional speech processing,
Beaucousin et al. suggested that the left inferior frontal and right
superior temporal areas are involved in the recognition of
emotions respectively through emotional lexico-semantic cues
and affective prosodic cues [4]. Crucially, regions strongly
associated with ToM processing, namely the dorsal mPFC and
left TPJ, were also recruited during the same experiment,
irrespective of the presence of emotional prosody. The application
of functional connectivity analyses to a second fMRI dataset
further revealed that the large set of brain regions involved in
emotional classification could be subdivided into two main
functional networks [5]: one that gathered perisylvian language
areas, and one that overlapped ToM regions [2]. Given this
involvement of a distinct coherent network of putatively ToM-
related regions (‘‘Medial network’’, including the pCC, left TPJ,
dmPFC and vmPFC), it seemed even more likely that the
emotional sentence processing entailed a form of ToM process.
The fact that the Medial network included the vmPFC was
particularly interesting. The function of this region has been
theorized as ‘‘a hub that connects systems involved in episodic memory,
representation of the affective qualities of sensory events, social cognition,
interoceptive signals, and evolutionarily conserved affective physiological and
behavioral responses’’, that ‘‘bridges conceptual and affective processes’’ [6].
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Accordingly, in an earlier review of imaging studies on the neural
bases of human social cognition, the ventral part of the mPFC was
discussed as likely to contain a ‘‘distinct neural substrate of emotional
empathy’’ [2]. The vmPFC and the orbitofrontal cortex are
considered key regions for affective ToM [7–10], which deals
with the representation of the emotional states of others. Affective
ToM shows a large neural overlap with the cognitive aspects of
ToM (dealing with thoughts, beliefs, intentions or desires) [7,8],
and is the particular facet of ToM that could be engaged during
affective speech processing.
In order to verify that, in the same group of participants, the
same brain regions that support emotional speech processing are
also involved in ToM, we scanned the volunteers who had
performed the emotional sentence classification tasks a second
time, with a new classification task on sentences describing mental
contents. Contrary to the emotional sentence classification task,
where the participants were only asked to classify the sentences
according to their emotional content, this task used explicit
mentalizing instructions. Compared with emotional situations, the
verbal description of mentalizing situations involved longer and
more complex sentences, including several characters and
embedded clauses (especially second-order beliefs, e.g. ‘‘he thinks
that she thinks that…’’). So as to avoid the confound of a different
syntactic complexity between the ToM and emotional sentence
classification tasks, we conceived two plausibility judgment tasks
on sentences that were matched on a one-to-one basis with the
ToM or emotional sentences, in terms of their number of words,
verbs and clauses. These structurally matched reference sentences
were devoid of ToM or emotional contents. This enabled the
comparison of mentalizing and the emotional aspects of sentence




The local ethics board (CCPRB: Comite´ Consultatif de
Protection des Personnes se Preˆtant a` la Recherche Biome´dicale,
Basse-Normandie) had approved the experimental protocol. The
participants gave their informed, written consent, and received an
allowance for their participation.
Participants
From the 51 participants to the previous study for which the
emotional speech processing data were acquired [5], we included a
total of 42 participants (26 males), comprising 2 left-handers (1
male), who were available for a second fMRI experiment. This
allowed the comparison of the different conditions in the same set
of participants. The mean Edinburgh score of right-handers was
93.3 (standard deviation = 13.6), while it was 2100.0 for the left-
handers. The median age of the group was 27.5 years (mean 6 sd:
30.968.6 years, range 18–53 years). The average level of
education was 15.9 years 63.4 years, minimum: 11 years,
maximum: 20 years) corresponding to 4 years of education after
the baccalaureate. Note that there was no correlation between age
and level of education in this group. We have not detected any
abnormality in the structural scans of any of the included
participants.
Cognitive Tasks
TOM and PLAUTOM tasks. In the TOM task, the
participants were asked to classify 48 French sentences into 3
different categories on the basis of the mental state they attributed
to the main character: belief, deception, or empathy. The
complete set of sentences used in TOM and other tasks is
presented as supplementary material (Materials S1).
Belief sentences could correspond to a 1st order situation, when
one has a conviction that is unfounded (With his rabbit-foot in his
pocket, he is sure to win the race), a belief based on an appearance that
is different from reality (Because of her disguise, the cafe’s landlord directed
her to the men’s toilets) or to 2nd order situations involving beliefs
about the intentions of another person (His girlfriend does not talk to
him about their next holidays because she thinks that he is going to leave her;
After what happened between them, she does not think that he will have the
audacity to meet her again). Deception sentences corresponded to
situations where a character deliberately lies (Arrested for running a
light, the driver maintains to the policeman that she went when the light was
green; Despite the smell, he assures his client that his fish is fresh), or
dissimulates his intentions (Anticlerical, he praises the pope with his
electoral speech to attract the Catholics). Empathy sentences correspond-
ed to situations where one shares or takes into account another
person’s feelings or emotions (On seeing his smiling face when arriving,
she feels that he shares the pleasure of this meeting; When they announce to the
patient that his tumour is benign, the doctors are pleased to see the patient’s
relief; To not ruin Pierre’s party, nobody told him that he sang flat).
The 48 TOM sentences included in the fMRI paradigm (16
sentences of each category) were selected from an initial corpus
composed of one set of 26 sentences (belief) and two sets of 24
sentences (deception and empathy, 74 total). In order to select the
best 48 sentences out of the initial set of 74, a group of 14
participants completed a preliminary experiment. The participants
were asked to classify the set of 74 sentences into the three
categories. A total of 26 sentences had to be excluded. To do so,
we removed the most ambiguous sentences (eliciting less than 7
correct responses, i.e. correctly classified by less than 50% of the
subjects) as well as those that were too easy (as shown by a
response time below 500 ms together with a number of correct
responses close to 14). This left an excess of 16 valid sentences,
which were chosen randomly. Nine of these extra sentences (3 for
each category) and their matched reference sentences were used in
a training session with the TOM and PLAUTOM tasks prior to
the fMRI experiment.
In PLAUTOM, participants had to evaluate whether a sentence
– which had a correct syntactic construction – was plausible or
not. Out of the 48 sentences, 15 (31.25%) were implausible. Note
that all TOM sentences were plausible. For each PLAUTOM
sentence, the same syntactic structure as the matching TOM
sentence was employed, while the semantic content was altered.
For instance, the implausible sentence matching the deception
sentence ‘‘Her meeting cancelled, she however tells her husband that she is
going to work late tonight’’ was ‘‘The marathon over, the pain tells the runner
that his muscles will be redacted tonight’’. By construction, the
sentences used in the PLAUTOM task thus were matched on a
one-to-one basis with the TOM sentences, in terms of their length,
number of words, number of verbs, and number of clauses (see
Table 1). Two-sample t-tests or Chi-squared tests comparing the
TOM stimuli to their PLAUTOM references did not show any
significant difference in terms of the duration of the stimuli
(p=0.38), or the number of words (p=0.55), verbs (p=1.0), clauses
(p=0.31) and adjectives (p=0.66) in the sentences. On the
opposite, there was a highly significant difference between these
two tasks concerning the number of characters involved per
sentence (p,0.0001, Table 1), in keeping with the social nature of
the TOM stimuli.
EMO, GRAM and PLAUEMO tasks. The volunteers had
previously performed two different runs of emotional sentence and
neutral sentences classification (EMO and GRAM tasks, see [4,5]
for details). As in the TOM protocol, the participants heard a total
Theory of Mind and Emotional Sentence Processing
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of 48 sentences. All EMO sentences were plausible. The
participants were asked to classify the emotional message conveyed
by the sentence into 3 categories (‘‘happy’’, ‘‘angry’’ or ‘‘sad’’). In the
GRAM task, the participant had to classify the sentences
according to the subject of the sentence (‘‘I’’, ‘‘you’’ or ‘‘he/she’’).
Regarding the new PLAUEMO reference task, similar to
PLAUTOM, the sentences matched the EMO sentences on a
one-to-one basis and lacked emotional content. The volunteers
had to evaluate whether the sentences were plausible or implausible
(15 implausible sentences out of 48). The duration of the
PLAUEMO sentences was slightly, but significantly higher than
both EMO and GRAM sentences (3.12 s versus 2.65 and 2.64 s,
both p-values ,0.0015, Table 1). The average durations of EMO
and GRAM sentences were not significantly different (Table 1,
[5]). EMO sentences did not differ significantly from PLAUEMO
sentences in terms of their total numbers of words (p=0.12), verbs
(p=0.66), clauses (p=0.68) or adjectives (p=0.18), but EMO
sentences contained significantly more characters (p,0.0001).
There were more characters in TOM sentences than in EMO
sentences (p=0.02), whereas the number of characters did not
differ significantly between PLAUTOM and PLAUEMO
(p=0.27). There were more characters in GRAM than either
PLAUEMO or PLAUTOM (both p,0.0001), and more charac-
ters in EMO than GRAM (p=0.0012). As for the comparison of
the long sentences (TOM and PLAUTOM) and short sentences
(EMO, GRAM and PLAUEMO tasks), as expected, the number
of words was significantly higher in the long-sentences paradigm
(all p-values ,0.0001, Table 1).
fMRI Protocol
The TOM, PLAUTOM and PLAUEMO data were acquired
in a second fMRI session with the same participant, several
months (10.5 on average) after a first session during which the
EMO and GRAM data were acquired. Each participant
performed two different runs of each task while in the magnet,
for a total of 10 runs over both sessions. For each task, each run
included 24 sentences, and was organized following a slow event-
related design (with a long interval between each stimulus so as to
allow the BOLD response to go back to baseline). The different
sentence categories occurred randomly, but in the same order for
all participants. After the end of the sentence, the participants had
to respond manually within 3 s. In order to keep the participants
focused on the experiment, after each sentence classification trial,
the participants performed a ‘‘beep detection task’’. They heard
the same two tones in a random order, separated by 2 to 8 s, and
had to respond upon hearing the lower-frequency tone. For the
EMO, PLAUEMO and GRAM tasks, the total event duration
(sentence classification plus beep detection) was 1462 s. For TOM
and PLAUTOM, with longer sentences, the interval was 1662 s.
The pulses sent by the MRI scanner triggered the onsets of the
events.
In all paradigms the presentation of the stimuli and recording of
responses were done using the E-Prime 1.2 software. The auditory
stimuli were delivered via MR compatible headphones (MR-
CONFON Gmbh), and the manual responses were collected using
an MR-compatible response-pad (Current Designs).
Debriefing
Shortly after the scanning session, the participants completed a
structured debriefing interview. The same questions, as written on
an interview form, were asked to the different participants. The
experimenter asked the questions and filled in the responses on the
interview form. After answering general questions, participants
had to report on their strategy during the TOM task. Using the
form, the experimenter recorded whether or not the participant
had used the following indices or strategy to classify the ToM
sentences: simulation of ones’ mental state, reliance on social
knowledge, analysis of the sentences’ lexical content (including the
analysis of a specific grammatical category such as verbs and
adjectives), analysis of the sentences’ structure, silent sentence
rehearsal, mental imagery of complex scenes, analysis of prosody.
The debriefing also included questions about the way the
participants solved the plausibility tasks: sentence rehearsal,
analysis of lexical content, attention to words situated at a
particular position in the sentence, silent rehearsal of the
sentences, prosody, mental imagery.
Image Acquisition
The data were acquired on the Philips Intera Achieva 3T
scanner at the GIP Cyceron (Caen, France). The anatomical scans
consisted of a T1-W sagittal 3D scan (18062566256 voxels, with a
1-mm isotropic resolution, FA=10u, TE= 4.6 ms, TR=20 ms,
TI = 800 ms, SENSE factor = 2 in both AP and LR directions),
and of a coarser T2*-W scan, with a T2-FFE sequence
(1286128670 voxels, 2 mm isotropic resolution, TE= 30 ms,
TR=3500 ms, FA= 90u, SENSE factor = 2), for cross-modal
registration with the EPI-BOLD time-series. For the functional
MRI, the sequence parameters were: 31 axial slices with a 64664
matrix, 3.75 mm isotropic voxel resolution, interleaved acquisi-
tion, TE=35 ms, TR=2 s, FA= 80u, no parallel imaging.
Image Processing
Image analysis was performed using the SPM5 software. The
T1-weighted scans of the participants were normalized to a site-
specific template (T-80TVS) matching the MNI space, using the
SPM5 ‘‘segment’’ procedure with otherwise default parameters. So
as to correct for subject motion during the fMRI runs, within each
run, the EPI-BOLD scans were realigned using a rigid-body
registration. The EPI-BOLD scans then were registered rigidly to
the structural T2-weighted image, which was itself registered to the
T1-weighted scan. The combination of all registration matrices
allowed warping the EPI-BOLD functional scans to the standard
space. Once in the standard space, a 6-mm FWHMGaussian filter
was applied.
Behavioral Data Analysis
We compared the accuracy (mean number of correct responses
per run, CR), the response times (RT) of correct answers, between
the TOM and PLAUTOM tasks using Wilcoxon rank tests.
Likewise, we compared the RTs and CRs of the PLAUEMO task
with those of the previously described EMO and GRAM tasks [5].
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sentences used in the 5
classification tasks (mean 6 sd).
TOM PLAUTOM EMO PLAUEMO GRAM
Duration
(sec)
4.6860.84 4.8161.04 2.6560.49 3.1260.62 2.6460.49
N words 15.5262.78 15.8163.04 10.7562.13 11.5262.29 9.4661.57
N verbs 3.4061.18 3.4061.25 2.2360.69 2.1560.71 2.1760.72
N characters 2.1260.49 0.4860.95 1.7860.78 0.6560.81 1.2760.61
N adjectives 0.7160.65 0.8360.75 0.6560.70 0.4260.61 0.3160.47
N clauses 2.7560.70 2.9660.71 1.4060.49 1.4460.50 1.1560.36
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.t001
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We also evaluated the effects of sex, age and education level on
RTs for each of the 5 tasks, using linear models.
On the basis of the participants’ answers to the debriefing
questionnaires, we computed descriptive statistics regarding the
various task-solving strategies used by the participants to complete
the TOM and PLAU tasks.
Statistical Analysis of Functional Data
Subject-level analyses. Regarding the functional imaging
data, for the 1st level (individual) analyses, we used the SPM
General Linear Model. For each of the 10 runs, we used a single
stimulus function, convolved with the canonical hemodynamic
response function. The different types of events within each run
were not separated. The event durations included the response
time. The motion parameters, as estimated by the motion
correction procedure, were included into the model.
Group level statistical parametric mapping. At the 2nd
level (group analysis), for the comparisons between tasks, we used a
repeated-measures ANOVA design (flexible factorial design), with
a Task factor with 5 levels (EMO, PLAUEMO, GRAM, TOM,
PLAUTOM). We had 2 contrast images for each subject in each
level (i.e. one image per run). A Subject factor with 42 levels
accounted for the between-subject variability. So as to be able to
assess the conjunction between the TOM and PLAUTOM tasks,
we computed a similar model, albeit without the Subject factor.
Note that tables report only clusters with more than 10 voxels in
order to limit their sizes.
ToM versus non-ToM sentence processing. So as to
highlight the brain regions involved in ToM relative to sentence
comprehension, we first contrasted the TOM and PLAUTOM
sentence classification task (p,0.05, FWE correction for multiple
comparisons), masking for positive signal variations during TOM.
Using the model without the Subject factor, we also computed the
conjunction between the TOM and PLAUTOM sentence
comprehension tasks (p,0.05, voxel-wise FWE correction for
multiple comparisons). In this case TOM or PLAUTOM
activations were measured relative to the baseline (beep detection).
Overlap between emotional and ToM sentence
processing. To identify the regions that respond to both
ToM and emotional sentence classification conditions more than
to plausibility judgment tasks on sentences, we computed the
conjunction between the [TOM – PLAUTOM] and [EMO –
PLAUEMO] contrasts. Of note, some unspecific overlap between
the two contrasts could occur for two different reasons, namely the
task-related deactivations common to PLAUEMO and PLAU-
TOM, and the comparison of 3-choice (belief, empathy, deception)
tasks to 2-choice tasks. In order to avoid such confounds, we
masked the contrasts of interest so as to include only voxels in
which the [EMO – GRAM] contrast is significant, at a voxel-wise
threshold of p,0.0001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons. The
GRAM condition is indeed devoid of emotional or ToM material,
but may not induce the same deactivations as PLAUEMO and
PLAUTOM, and has the same number of possible responses as
TOM or EMO. We thus used the two different reference tasks for
EMO to increase specificity.
Differences between emotional and ToM sentence
processing. In order to distinguish the regions that are more
involved during ToM sentence processing than during emotional
sentence processing, and vice versa, we computed the two possible
one-sided comparisons between the [TOM – PLAUTOM] and
[EMO – PLAUEMO] contrasts (i.e. the two interaction contrasts).
The statistical threshold was again set at p,0.05 with a voxel-wise
FWE correction for multiple comparisons. For the [EMO –
PLAUEMO] – [TOM – PLAUTOM] contrast, showing the
regions more associated with emotional than with ToM sentence
processing, we also masked the results inclusively by the [EMO –
GRAM] contrast at p,0.0001 uncorrected, in keeping with the
previous conjunction analysis. The reverse contrast was masked
inclusively by [TOM – PLAUTOM] activations at an uncorrected
threshold (p,0.0001 voxel-wise), so as to exclude results driven
uniquely by greater activations during PLAUEMO compared with
EMO.
ROI based analyses. So as to test the hypothesis that the
‘‘Medial network’’ regions identified in the previous study [5] are
active during mentalizing, we extracted the contrast values for the
5 tasks in each of the 6 regions-of-interest (ROIs, radius of 4 mm).
These 6 ROIs consisted of the bilateral dmPFC (3 ROIs, with
MNI x y z coordinates triplets, in mm: 26 56 34, 6 54 36, 6 58
24), the vmPFC (at 22 46 212), the pCC (at 24 50 28) and the
left TPJ (at 242 60 26). We applied two-sided t-tests on the TOM,
PLAUTOM, PLAUEMO and TOM – PLAUTOM contrasts
(each time using the average of the two replications, with 41
degrees of freedom), with a Holm-Bonferroni stepwise correction
for multiple comparisons (6 null-hypotheses), within each of the 4
contrasts. The EMO and GRAM conditions were not tested as
they had been used for ROI definition and this analysis would
have been circular.
We performed further analyses in the vmPFC, aimed at
assessing the specific hypothesis that the Empathy condition of the
TOM task, due to its affective component, would show a stronger
response than Belief or Deception. We used 4-mm ROIs positioned
over peaks of stronger activity during TOM, EMO or both in the
whole brain analyses, and data from similar 1st level SPM models
as presented above, except with separate stimulus functions for
each of the 3 conditions. We performed the two-by-two
comparisons between the 3 TOM conditions using paired two-
sample t-tests. No correction for multiple comparisons was applied
in this exploratory analysis.
Results
Behavioural Data
ToM and PLAUTOM tasks. Descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 2. For both TOM and PLAUTOM tasks,
accuracy was high, and PLAUTOM was better succeeded to than
TOM (Wilcoxon test on CR: p,0.0001). Accordingly, RTs were
significantly higher during TOM as compared with PLAUTOM
(p,0.0001).
PLAUEMO, EMO and GRAM tasks. We observed a
slightly, but significantly higher accuracy during EMO or GRAM
compared with PLAUEMO (both tests: p,0.0001, Table 2), and
significantly shorter response times for GRAM compared with
either PLAUEMO (p,0.0001) or EMO (p,0.0001, as previously
shown [5]). The RTs during EMO and PLAUEMO and the
number of CR during EMO and GRAM did not differ
significantly (p=0.17 and p=0.95 respectively). The participants
also displayed significantly longer RTs during PLAUEMO than
during PLAUTOM (p=0.0056, Table 2), but their accuracy was
Table 2. Behavioral data for the 5 tasks (mean 6 SD).
TOM PLAUTOM EMO PLAUEMO GRAM
RC
(total 24)
20.3361.84 22.6561.06 23.6060.53 22.5661.26 23.5760.52
RT (ms) 9356252 7036218 7206250 7546194 6206228
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.t002
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not significantly different between these two tasks (p=0.62). The
RTs were significantly longer and CR numbers significantly lower
during TOM compared with the PLAUEMO, EMO, or GRAM
conditions (all p-values ,0.0001).
Effects of age, sex and education level. There was no
significant effect of age or sex on the RTs for any of the 5 tasks
(EMO, age: p=0.34, sex: p=0.78; GRAM, age: p=0.87 p= 0.27;
PLAUEMO, age: p=0.69, sex: p=0.36; TOM, age: p=0.60, sex:
p=0.47; PLAUTOM, age: p=0.83, sex: p=0.18). More years of
education, however, were associated with faster responses at the
TOM task (p,0.05). A similar but non-significant trend was
observed for EMO and GRAM (p,0.1), but not PLAUTOM
(p=0.33) or PLAUEMO (p=0.30).
Debriefing questionnaire. Regarding the strategies em-
ployed by the 42 participants during the TOM task, 81% of them
reported to have relied on their experience of social interactions.
Simulation of the characters perspective was reported by 57% of
the participants. The verbs of the sentences were a useful cue for
83% of the participants. Adjectives were useful according to 50%
of the participants. Mental imagery of complex scenes was
reported by 62% of the participants. Mental imagery of a dialogue
(conversation with the speaker) was reported by only 4 participants
(9%), and feeling emotions by 6 participants (14%). Eight
participants reportedly relied on intonation (19.5%). Mental
rehearsal of the sentences was reported by 62% (26) of the
participants.
As expected, in order to solve the PLAU tasks, the participants
relied on the meaning of the sentences and words (95 and 90% of
the participants), and paid particular attention to words located at
the end of the sentence (72.5% of participants). This task entailed
mental imagery of the sentences’ content in 65% of the
participants (20 out of the 31 participants to whom we had asked
this question), of whom 45% (9) reported that this was helpful.
fMRI Data
Areas involved in sentence comprehension. The conjunc-
tion of TOM and PLAUTOM activations (Figure 1, in red)
revealed significant bilateral activations in the superior temporal
gyrus, from the pole to the posterior verticalization of the Superior
Temporal Sulcus (STS), in the inferior frontal gyrus, extending
into the adjacent precentral gyrus or anterior insula, and in the
calcarine fissure (voxel-level threshold: p,0.05, FWE correction
for multiple comparisons). The left sensorimotor cortex, thalami,
anterior globi pallidi and the SMA/preSMA region were also
activated by both tasks. A cluster of left dmPFC was also
significantly activated (x =210, y= 60, z = 34, t = 6.68 with 52
voxels, visible on the slice at z = 32 in Figure 1).
Areas involved in ToM. The contrast between TOM and
PLAUTOM (Table 3, Figure 1) revealed significant bilateral
activations of the TPJ (voxel-level threshold: p,0.05, FWE
correction). This location corresponded to the portion of the
angular gyrus that is situated at the axial height level of the point of
verticalization of the Sylvian fissure, which constitutes the anterior
landmark for the separation of the temporal and parietal lobes.
The activation of the TPJ was more significant and more extended
in the right hemisphere. A strong activation cluster spanned the
precuneus and pCC. The dorsal mPFC was also activated in two
separate parts, in the left and right hemisphere, with the right
hemisphere cluster being slightly lower and larger. The anterior
middle temporal gyrus (MTG) of the right hemisphere, below the
STS, was also recruited by TOM compared with PLAUTOM. A
cluster of 3 voxels at MNI coordinates x = 2, y = 56, z =28
(t = 5.14) and a single voxel at x = 2, y = 54, z =212 (t = 4.86) were
found in the anterior vmPFC region (a-vmPFC).
In the left middle frontal gyrus, two separate activations were
found, one near the anterior convexity of the frontal lobe, and the
second one just before the junction of the inferior frontal sulcus
with the precentral sulcus. Strong activation foci were found in the
caudate nuclei, in a bilateral activation cluster that extended
posteriorly into the thalami, and into the anterior putamen.
Activations were also present in the left intraparietal sulcus and in
the depths of the right postcentral sulcus, the bilateral posterior
end of the superior frontal sulcus, and in sensory or motor regions
such as the central sulcus and SMA.
Areas active during both ToM and emotional sentence
processing. Among the areas activated during the TOM –
PLAUTOM contrast described above, the conjunction analysis
between [TOM – PLAUTOM] and [EMO – PLAUEMO]
revealed significant overlap at the level of the right MTG, bilateral
TPJ, pCC, and both clusters of dmPFC (voxel-level threshold:
p,0.05, FWE correction). Overlap was also seen at the level of the
inferior frontal sulcus. These areas are highlighted by the blue
contours in Figure 1, and listed in Table 3. The a-vmPFC voxel at
x = 2, y = 54, z =212 was included in the conjunction analysis.
Differences between ToM and emotional sentence
processing. Relative to their plausibility judgment tasks, ToM
sentence classification elicited greater activity than emotional
sentence classification in the caudate nuclei and adjacent putamen
and thalamus, and the paracingulate cortex (voxel-level threshold:
p,0.05, FWE correction). Other areas included the bilateral
posterior superior frontal sulcus and neighboring middle frontal
gyrus, the left anterior superior frontal sulcus near the convexity of
the fontal lobe, as well as the left intraparietal sulcus (Figure 2,
Table 4).
Conversely, the EMO task was associated with greater activity
than TOM in the anterior and posterior superior temporal sulcus
bilaterally, the anterior and medial planum polare or adjacent
insula, and in a more posterior vmPFC region (p-vmPFC, Figure 2,
Table 4).
Regional Analyses
The BOLD signal variations across the 5 tasks in the 6 ROIs
that constituted the previously described Medial network [5] are
shown in Figure 3. The statistical analyses (Table 5) revealed that,
except in the vmPFC (blue dot), all the regions of the Medial
network were active during TOM compared with beep-detection
baseline, or during TOM compared with PLAUTOM.
During the plausibility judgment tasks, the left TPJ showed a
significant activation during the PLAUTOM, but not the
PLAUEMO judgment task (Table 5), likely related to a difference
in syntactic complexity between these two tasks. The uppermost
left and right dmPFC regions (orange dots) were recruited during
both PLAUEMO and PLAUTOM. Conversely, the inferior right
dmPFC tended to display deactivations during these two tasks,
reaching statistical significance only during PLAUTOM. The
pCC displayed significant deactivations during both plausibility
tasks. No significant change was detected in the vmPFC during
PLAU tasks.
Because a greater involvement of the vmPFC in affective
compared to cognitive ToM is reported in the literature [10], we
compared the 3 conditions of TOM (Belief, Deception, Empathy) in 3
ROIs located within this region. The most anterior ROI was the a-
vmPFC peak of the conjunction analysis, followed by the Medial
network ROI (m-vmPFC), and p-vmPFC peak of EMO minus
TOM comparison (Figure 4). Empathy did not differ significantly
from Belief (a-vmPFC: p=0.46, m-vmPFC: p=0.64, p-vmPFC:
p=0.58) or Deception (p=0.38, p=0.24, p=0.09). Deception differed
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from Belief in the m-vmPFC and p-vmPFC (p=0.01 and
p=761024 respectively, a-vmPFC: p=0.07).
Discussion
This study demonstrated that the emotional component of
sentence comprehension and ToM recruit both common and
specific areas. The ROI based analyses confirmed that the
coherent network of 6 medial and angular regions that is recruited
during the emotional component of sentence comprehension (the
Medial network defined in [5]) is also active during a task probing
the neural bases of ToM. The vmPFC ROI of this network (m-
vmPFC) was the only exception, and this may be due to the
particular status of the vmPFC with respect to cognitive and
affective processes. The exploratory whole-brain analyses accord-
ingly detected a spatial overlap between emotional and ToM
sentence processing in regions that are important for mentalizing,
such as the TPJ bilaterally, the posterior cingulate cortex, the right
MTG and the left and right dorsal mPFC. In the vmPFC area, a
trend towards activation during TOM was found in a more
anterior part (a-vmPFC). A significantly higher activity during
emotional compared with ToM sentence processing was nonethe-
less observed in the posterior part of the vmPFC (p-vmPFC,
Figure 3).
Prior to evaluating the role of this region in mentalizing in the
light of the differences between the EMO and TOM tasks, and
then interpreting the involvement of the caudate and other brain
regions during TOM compared with EMO, the discussion will
first deal with the overlap between ToM and emotional sentence
processing networks, and the relationships between the ToM
network and sentence comprehension.
Overlap between ToM and the Emotional Component of
Sentence Comprehension
In accordance with our starting hypothesis, the results
confirmed that a same coherent network contributes to both
ToM and emotional components of sentence comprehension. The
distributed network shared by ToM and emotional components of
sentence processing displays similarities with the default mode
network, especially the dmPFC subsystem and core components
[11]. This network has been associated with several more or less
overlapping cognitive functions, such as story comprehension [12],
self-projection during mind wandering, ToM, prospection and
episodic memory [13,14], or semantic processing [15–17]. Within
Figure 1. Overlap between emotional and ToM sentence processing (in blue). Three-plane views and surface renderings of the significant
activations during language comprehension (conjunction of PLAUTOM and TOM, in warm colors) and ToM sentence comprehension) as compared
with a plausibility judgment task on sentences of comparable complexity (TOM - PLAUTOM, in green). The overlap between the TOM task and the
emotional sentence classification task (EMO), relative to their matched plausibility judgment tasks (PLAUTOM and PLAUEMO) is rendered or
contoured in blue (conjunction analysis, p,0.05 FWE). The functional data (SPM t-map) are overlaid on the mean grey matter image of the stereotaxic
template (T-80TVS, MNI space). The functional activation threshold was set at p,0.05, FWE correction for multiple comparisons. The conjunction was
masked so as to include only areas that also differ between the EMO and GRAM tasks (at p,0.0001, uncorrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.g001
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this network, the TPJ region has also been associated with bottom-
up attention orienting [18,19]. The activity of this network,
although it is clearly involved in mental representation processing,
may not be restricted to mentalizing.
Nonetheless, studies comparing affective and cognitive ToM
cartoons [7,8] have reported a neural overlap in the same regions
as those evidenced in the present study between EMO and TOM
(Figure 1). Importantly, solving the EMO task did not explicitly
require ToM processes, as emotion recognition from affective
prosody or words is sufficient and the instructions focused on the
sentences. In contrast, the TOM task explicitly required mentaliz-
ing. The results thus suggest that an additional process akin to
ToM occurs during the EMO task, as part of the emotional
component of affective sentence comprehension. In the EMO task
debriefing interviews, a large majority of the participants answered
positively to questions about their reliance upon the simulation of
the speakers’ perspective (simulation-theory) and/or their social
knowledge (theory-theory) [5].
Right hemisphere TPJ and MTG regions, which had not
been sampled in the previous study, were evidenced in the
present study as part of the regions shared by both EMO and
TOM tasks. This difference is explained by the response profiles
of the right TPJ and MTG peaks, which were either deactivated
or not activated during PLAUEMO. Compared with the
GRAM reference task, which elicited a slightly greater activity
in these regions, the use of PLAUTOM increased the sensitivity
of the subtraction analysis (Figure 3). The fact that both these
regions were found in TOM – PLAUTOM as well as in EMO
– PLAUEMO (Figure 1) is fully consistent with their reliable
involvement in ToM tasks [20], as well as with their functional
connectivity pattern [21].
Although the ‘‘Medial network’’ did not incorporate any lateral
prefrontal ROIs, the left posterior inferior frontal sulcus was
selected by the conjunction analysis. This region, however, has
been associated with sentence processing [22] as well as cognitive
control [23,24]. Accordingly, a possible reason why this region
supports both emotional and ToM sentence comprehension is that
such sentences would require a more intensive processing than
reference sentences.
Language and ToM
The results support the view that verbal ‘‘fictional third-person
stories’’ are appropriate stimuli for the functional imaging of ToM
[25]. In the present experiments, we used spoken sentences, which
constitute shorter stimuli than false-belief stories and fit within an
event-related design. The protocol was sensitive enough to enable
the detection of ToM-related activations, and separate them from
language-related activations (Figure 1). The debriefing also
suggested that the participants took into account linguistic cues
when classifying the ToM sentences, particularly mental state
words. This further confirms that one can rely on this set of
linguistic tools for mental state representation when studying ToM
with functional imaging [25,26].
Some of the ROIs of the Medial, ToM-related network, namely
the dmPFC and left TPJ appeared to respond as well to sentence
processing during plausibility judgments, albeit to a lesser extent
(Figure 3). Both regions may thus participate of the interface
between the ToM and the language-related networks, which seems
necessary for accurate verbal communication, for instance in the
case of irony or indirect requests [27–29]. The dmPFC is more
strongly connected with the IFG during the processing of ironic as
opposed to literal texts, a contrast that also evidences the
involvement of ToM regions in the pragmatic aspects of sentence
comprehension [29]. The engagement of the dmPFC region
during sentence comprehension is further suggested by the fact
that, in the whole brain analyses, a significant cluster was found
just next to this left dmPFC ROI in the conjunction between
TOM and PLAUTOM. This result is consistent with previous
observations of activity in the dmPFC region during language tasks
involving series of sentences, in the absence of ToM and in relation
with text-coherence building or reasoning [30,31]. During
plausibility judgments, the left TPJ was significantly active only
with the more complex PLAUTOM sentences. Conversely, the
right TPJ showed deactivations during spoken sentence compre-
hension, thereby appearing more specific of mental-state repre-
Table 3. Stereotaxic peak coordinates (MNI space,
coordinates in mm, p,0.05 FWE, clusters with more than 10
voxels) for the theory of mind task contrast and conjunction
between EMO and TOM tasks, relative to their reference
(PLAUEMO and PLAUTOM).
Anatomical region x y z N voxels t
[TOM – PLAUTOM]
Bilateral precuneus 26 68 38 6616 12.19
8 260 30 9.88
Bilateral intraparietal sulcus 236 252 42 10.80
18 264 54 5.91
Bilateral TPJ 244 260 24 6.15
52 254 24 1163 9.63
Bilateral caudate head 28 8 2 4165 10.07
8 6 0 8.86
Left anterior middle
frontal gyrus
244 58 2 387 8.61
Bilateral posterior inferior
frontal sulcus
44 22 32 24 5.13
244 28 32 1873 7.96
Bilateral posterior superior
frontal sulcus
232 6 58 7.48
32 6 56 780 6.42
Right middle temporal gyrus 62 24 224 588 7.42
Bilateral dmPFC 4 64 22 166 6.33
24 52 38 23 5.32
SMA 4 2 56 199 6.06
Right postcentral sulcus 40 226 36 194 5.73
Cerebellum 22 246 226 28 5.68
Left central sulcus 242 218 56 11 5.10
[EMO – PLAUEMO] & [TOM – PLAUTOM]
Bilateral posterior cingulate
cortex
26 252 30 102 9.96
Bilateral TPJ 54 250 24 322 9.13
244 258 22 65 5.66
Right anterior middle temporal
gyrus
62 26 222 359 7.40
Left posterior inferior frontal
sulcus
246 26 28 128 6.86
Bilateral dmPFC 4 62 22 164 6.17
24 52 38 22 5.32
The t statistic for each peak, and the size of the corresponding activation cluster
in number of voxels (8 mm3 volume) are also presented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.t003
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sentation [20] than its left counterpart during the processing of
either emotional or ToM sentences.
Finally, the bilateral activations of the anterior and posterior
STS that were found in the comparison of EMO and TOM,
relative to the plausibility judgment tasks (Figure 2), may be
associated with the processing of affective prosody, which was
present only during the EMO task (Figure 2). In our previous
analyses of the functional connectivity during the EMO task [5],
both these STS regions were included in the Perisylvian, speech-
processing networks, as opposed to the Medial, ToM-related
network. We hypothesize that the anterior STS regions are
involved in the analysis of the speech signal, while the more
posterior regions are involved in the integration of the extracted
prosodic information with emotional, syntactic and semantic
processes [4].
Emotional Speech, ToM and the Ventromedial Prefrontal
Cortex
The vmPFC displayed a complex behavior (Figure 4). The
activity was larger during EMO in all 3 vmPFC ROIs.
Nonetheless, in the whole brain analyses, with a conservative
voxel-wise threshold, and relative to the two plausibility judgment
tasks, EMO was significantly more active than TOM only in the p-
vmPFC. At the same threshold, the TOM task elicited a
significantly greater activity than PLAUTOM only in the a-
vmPFC. One can conclude that, as a whole, the vmPFC may be
significantly, but marginally involved during ToM sentence
Figure 2. Differences between emotional and ToM sentence processing, as assessed by comparisons between EMO (blue shades)
and TOM (green shades), relative to their corresponding plausibility judgment tasks (PLAUEMO and PLAUTOM). The functional data
(SPM t-map) are overlaid on a representative subject in the MNI space, on white matter surface and on axial slices in neurological orientation. The
accompanying plots (mean 6 SEM) present the SPM contrast values (relative to beep-detection baseline) during the two pairs of sentence
comprehension tasks in the regions more active during EMO than TOM (blue lines), and during TOM compared with EMO (green lines), contrasted to
the PLAUEMO and PLAUTOM reference tasks. The voxel-wise functional activation threshold was set at p,0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons.
The [EMO – PLAUEMO] – [TOM – PLAUTOM] contrast, showing regions more active during emotional than ToM speech processing, was masked
inclusively by the EMO – GRAM contrast (at p,0.0001, uncorrected). The reverse contrast ([TOM – PLAUTOM] – [EMO – PLAUEMO]) was masked
inclusively by the TOM – PLAUTOM contrast (at p,0.0001, uncorrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.g002
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processing compared with plausibility judgments. This trend for an
activation of the anterior vmPFC during TOM compared with
PLAUTOM is in line with the fact that the vmPFC is functionally
connected [5,11] and frequently co-activated (http://neurosynth.
org/seeds/-4_48_-12 [32]) with the network of ToM regions:
changes in the activity of this network may thus be reflected in the
vmPFC.
Conversely, the differential involvement of the p-vmPFC during
the EMO and TOM tasks is consistent with the literature on
affective and cognitive ToM [7,9,10]. This appears as a likely
consequence of the focus on emotional material in the EMO task.
Brothers and Ring had distinguished between the ‘‘hot and cold
aspects of representation of mind’’, with the phylogenetically older
hot aspects originating from the fact that the intentions of the
observed can have important social and emotional consequences
for the observer [33]. The fact that the EMO sentences, but not
the TOM sentences, were play-acted – with the presence of
congruent affective prosody - made the EMO task hotter than the
TOM task (including the TOM Empathy condition, which involved
the mental states of absent and unfamiliar others, without a direct
focus on emotions).
It has been proposed that the vmPFC would link decisions or
situations with their emotional consequences, and may mark
mental representations with affective information in the particular
context of mentalizing [10,34]. Accordingly, during the emotional
sentence classification task, the vmPFC might incorporate online-
generated information coming from emotional brain regions,
especially the emotional prosody processing systems of the STS,
into a broader emotional mental-state attribution process that
would integrate all the information extracted from the sentence. In
the particular context of isolated sentences, the presence of such
affective information, rather than the object of the mentalizing
(epistemic or emotional mental states), might be the strongest
determinant of the involvement of the vmPFC during ToM: this
would explain why the TOM Empathy condition was not especially
associated with increased activity in the vmPFC ROIs (Figure 4).
Under this hypothesis, the amygdala, given its importance in
emotional processing and its connections with the vmPFC [35],
might also be expected to interact with the vmPFC during the
EMO task. Although we have previously reported an increased
activation during EMO compared with GRAM in the amygdala
[5], we did not detect a significant difference between EMO and
TOM, relative to PLAU and PLAUTOM in this region.
ToM Sentence Processing and Executive Function
The TOM task sentences involved more complex mental states
than the EMO task. Strikingly, the region that showed the greatest
difference in terms of hemodynamic activity during TOM,
compared with EMO, was the caudate nucleus, bilaterally.
Activations of the caudate nucleus are sometimes reported in a
sentence-processing context, for instance during metaphor com-
prehension [36] or when reading sentences in a non-native
language [37]. Besides, deficits in both affective and cognitive
ToM have been described in Parkinson’s disease, a condition in
which the striatum is affected [38–41]. The review by Poletti et al.
concludes that cognitive ToM is the mainly concerned compo-
nent, while the affective component could be impaired later on
during the course of the disease [42]. The cognitive alterations
associated with Parkinson’s disease have been described as
‘‘predominantly executive’’, affecting the mechanisms that allow
several simultaneous processes to coexist efficiently during
complex cognitive tasks [43]. Accordingly, the early effect of the
Table 4. Stereotaxic peak coordinates (MNI space, coordinates in mm) for the differences between EMO and TOM tasks, relative to
their references (PLAUEMO and PLAUTOM).
Anatomical region x y z N voxels (8 mm3) T
[TOM – PLAUTOM] – [EMO – PLAUEMO]
Bilateral caudate nucleus 10 10 0 405 8.99
210 8 0 422 7.81
Left paracingulate cortex 28 20 44 236 7.28
Left intraoccipital sulcus 234 278 38 21 6.66
Left anterior superior frontal sulcus 220 62 4 57 6.22
Left intraparietal sulcus 244 254 44 101 6.20
Left superior frontal sulcus 228 6 60 81 6.17
Bilateral middle frontal gyrus/superior frontal sulcus 232 22 52 154 5.72
34 12 56 37 5.52
[EMO – PLAUEMO] – [TOM – PLAUTOM]
Bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus 52 238 12 340 8.13
254 242 10 217 7.52
Bilateral anterior planum polare/insula 38 4 216 66 7.47
236 2 218 11 5.48
Left posterior planum temporale 258 242 24 48 6.53
Bilateral anterior STS 52 14 222 75 6.33
60 28 26 57 6.04
250 6 210 70 6.02
vmPFC 2 38 214 25 5.57
The T statistic for each peak, and the size of the corresponding activation cluster in number of voxels (8 mm3 volume) are also presented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.t004
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disease on ToM could be mediated in part by a negative effect of
dopamine depletion in the dorsolateral frontostriatal circuit on
executive functions performed by the prefrontal cortex [42], such
as working memory or inhibition, which are important for solving
false-belief ToM tasks [44].
If impairments in ToM processing can occur as a consequence
of executive dysfunction caused by impairment of fronto-striatal
circuits, then the widespread activation of the striatum observed
during TOM, compared with EMO, could reflect the executive
processes supporting the TOM task. Several regions known to be
involved in executive function were also activated along with the
caudate nuclei during the TOM task: we found a bilateral increase
in activity during TOM compared with EMO in the posterior
superior frontal sulcus, paracingulate cortex and intraparietal
sulcus (Figure 2, Table 4). The paracingulate region is associated
with response selection and conflict monitoring [45], and shows
connectivity with the caudate in anatomical and functional terms
[46–48]. The results suggest that the different sentence classifica-
tion tasks imposed different constraints on the executive processes
supporting ToM or sentence comprehension processes, thus
modulating the activity in executive neural networks. TOM, of
all the sentence classification tasks involved in the present study,
was the hardest to perform, with a greater error rate and longer
response times than PLAUTOM.
Study Limitations
When interpreting these results, it is also important to keep in
mind the limitations of the experimental design. We had to
acquire the data for the EMO and PLAUEMO tasks on two
different sessions, whereas the TOM and PLAUTOM tasks were
acquired on the same day. It is therefore not possible to rule out
that systematic intersession differences could have affected the
sensitivity or the outcome of the relative comparison of the EMO
and TOM tasks.
The second point concerns differences in performances across
tasks. Although the PLAU tasks eliminated differences in terms of
stimuli length and grammatical construction, the EMO and TOM
sentences were different on average in terms of the response times
Figure 3. Response profile of Medial-network nodes (mean ± SEM). The BOLD contrast values during the EMO, GRAM, and PLAUEMO tasks
(blue shades), and TOM and PLAUTOM tasks (green shades), relative to beep-detection baseline, were extracted in the 6 regions of the Medial
network defined in a previous study using the EMO and GRAM tasks (dmPFC, vmPFC, pCC and Left TPJ; blue labels, see [5]). The coloured spheres
(4 mm radius) indicate the regions-of-interest. We added the two mentalizing regions of the right hemisphere (R TPJ and R MTG; green labels),
uncovered by the addition of the TOM, PLAUTOM and PLAUEMO tasks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.g003
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and accuracy as a direct consequence of the more complex
situations that had to be used in the TOM task. Note that
adjusting for response times in second-level analyses did not affect
the pattern of significant results.
Conclusion
This neuroimaging study used sentence classification tasks based
either on emotions or type of mental contents to compare the
neural correlates of emotional and mental-state-related compo-
nents of speech comprehension. A network of shared functional
areas was found, with classical ToM regions being recruited in
both ToM and emotion classification tasks. This suggests an
intricate relation between emotion recognition and the inference
of the cognitive states of others, with ToM processes being
automatically involved during emotional sentence comprehension.
This automaticity is suggested by the fact that the participants
were instructed to classify sentence contents, not the emotional
states of the speaker. Compared with the ToM task, emotional
sentence classification was associated with increased activity in the
bilateral posterior and anterior STS, likely in relation with the
processing of emotional prosody cues, as well as in the p-vmPFC.
Previous research on affective and cognitive ToM [10] indicates
that this latter region would be involved in the representation of
emotional mental states. Accordingly, in the present study, the
vmPFC was more active in an affective sentence classification task,
in the presence of emotional material (words and prosody),
compared with a colder task in which one had to represent the
minds of absent, unfamiliar characters of sentences which were
read in a neutral way.
Supporting Information
Materials S1 List of the sentences used in the 5 tasks
(TOM, PLAUTOM, EMO, PLAUEMO, GRAM). Each task
comprised 48 sentences, separated in 2 fMRI runs of 24 sentences.
The numbers of the PLAUTOM and PLAUEMO sentences
match those of the sentences of the TOM and EMO sentences
they were derived from. The bold letters in PLAUTOM and
PLAUEMO highlight the incongruent words in the implausible
sentences. For the GRAM task, the numbers at the end of the lines

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Average BOLD response of 3 vmPFC regions-of-
interest to the 3 different conditions of EMO or TOM (mean ±
SEM). Left: significant region from the EMO and TOM conjunction (a-
vmPFC); Centre: region of the Medial network (m-vmPFC); Right:
significant region from the EMO – TOM comparison (p-vmPFC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054400.g004
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